State v. Wright Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 34017 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-27-2008
State v. Wright Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34017
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Wright Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34017" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1575.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1575
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




) NO. 34017 
1 
j . . vs. 
1 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE CHERl C. COPSEY 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
Attorney General Deputy State Appellate 
State of Idaho Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER Boise, Idaho 83703 
Deputy Attorney General (208) 334-2712 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 






IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) 




MICHAEL JORDAN WRIGHT, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. 1 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE CHERl C. COPSEY 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
Attorney General Deputy State Appellate 
State of Idaho Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER Boise, Idaho 83703 
Deputy Attorney General (208) 334-2712 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
............................................................................. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings ......................... 1 
ISSUES ............................................................................................................ 2
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 3 
I. Wright Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In 
The District Court's Order Holding Inadmissible 
The Proffered Testimony Of Dr. Malpass ....................... . .....,. 3 
A. Introduction ..................................................................... 3 
B. Standard of Review ......................................................... 4 
C. Wright Has Failed To Show Any Abuse Of 
Discretion In The District Court's Determination 
That The Testimony Of Dr. Malpass Was . . lnadm~ss~ble ..................................................................... 4 
II. Wright Has Failed To Show Error In The District 
Court's Rejection Of A Jury Instruction Telling The 
Jury To Consider Certain Factors In Evaluating 
Eyewitness Identification Testimony ........................................... 9 
A. Introduction ...................................................................... 9 
B. Standard of Review ......................................................... 9 
C. Wright Has Failed To Show That The 
Instructions Given By The Court Misled 
........................................... The Jury Or Prejudiced Him I 0  
Ill . Wright Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In Sentencing ................. 13 
A . Introduction .................................................................... 13 
B . Standard Of Review ....................................................... 14 
C . Wright's Claim On Appeal That The Court 
Found Premeditation Is Directly Contrary 
To The Record ............................................................... 15 
D . Wright Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of 
.................. Sentencing Discretion By The District Court 16 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 18 
....................................................................... CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 19 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
. ................................................. Gunnina v . State. 701 A.2d 374 (Md 1997) 10. 13 
McMillan v . Pennsvlvania. 477 U.S. 79 (1986) ................................................... 15 
People v . Chambers. 52 Cal.3d 81 5. 802 P.2d 906 (Cal . 1991) ......................... 12 
People v . Ochoa. 19 ~ a l . 4 ~ ~  353. 966 P.2d 442 (Cal . 1998) ............................. 12 
People v . Rodriaues. 8 Cal . 4'h 1060. 885 P.2d 1 (Cal . 1994) .......................... 12 
People v . Wright. 45 Cal.3d 1126. 755 P.2d 1049 (Cal . 1988) ..................... 12. 13 
State v . Broadhead. 120 Idaho 141. 814 P.2d 401 (1991) ............................... 14 
........... State v . Brown. 121 Idaho 385. 825 P.2d 482 (1992) ........................ . 14 
i 
State v . Bundy. 122 Idaho 11 1. 831 P.2d 953 (Ct . App . 1992) ........................... 15 
State v . Colwell. 124 Idaho 560. 861 P.2d 1225 (Ct . App . 1993) ....................... 10 
State v . Crea. 119 Idaho 352. 806 P.2d 445 (1991) ............................................. 4 
I 
I State v . Hedqer. 1 15 Idaho 598.. 768 P.2d 1331 (1989) .................................... 14 
State v . Holmes', 104 Idaho 312. 658 P.2d 983 (Ct . App . 1983) ......................... 15 
State v . Jenkins. 133 Idaho 747. 992 P.2d 196 (1 999) ....................................... 14 
State v . Johns. 112 Idaho 873. 736 P.2d 1327 (1987) ....................................... 10 
State v . Johnson. 136 Idaho 701. 39 P.3d 641 (Ct . App . 2001) ......................... 16 
State v . Josl~n. 145 Idaho 75. 175 P.3d 764 (2007) ........................................... 4 
State v . Keaveny. 136 Idaho 31. 28 P.3d 372 (2001) ......................................... 9 
State v . Martin. 142 Idaho 58. 122 P.3d 317 (Ct . App . 2005) ............................. 15 
State v . Pacheco. 134 Idaho 367. 2 P.3d 752 (Ct . App . 2000) ........................... 11 
State v . Parkinson. 128 Idaho 29. 909 P.2d 647 (Ct . App . 1996) ......................... 4 
State v . Pierce. 100 Idaho 57. 593 P.2d 392 (1979) .......................................... 15 
State v . Rovles. 598 P.2d 1249 (Or . App . 1979) ................................................ 13 
State v . Row, 131 Idaho 303. 955 P.2d 1082 (1998) ......................................... 10 
. . . ....................... I State v Sanchez. 142 Idaho 309. 127 P.3d 212 (Ct App 2005) 11 
. . . ......................... State v Schneider. 129 Idaho 59. 921 P.2d 759 (Ct App 1996) 5 
I 
I 
State v . Stricklin. 136 Idaho 264. 32 P.3d 158 (Ct . App . 2001) ......................... 10 
State v . Thomas. 133 Idaho 682. 991 P.2d 870 (Ct . App . 1999) ........................ 14 
United States v . Boney. 977 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir . 1992) .................................... 13 
I th . United States v . Brooks, 928 F.2d 1403 (4 Clr . 1991) ...................................... 13 
United States v . Villiard. 186 F.3d 893 (8'h Cir . 1999) ........................................ 5 
United States v . Watts. 519 U.S. 148 (1997) .................................................... 15 
Weeks v . Eastern ldaho Health Services. 
143 Idaho 834. 153 P.3d 1180 (2007) ..................................... ..: .... 
RULES 
............................................................................................................ I I.R.E. 702 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Jordan Wright, a.k.a. Robo, Robo-G, Coon, Jamal, Atkins, 
Looney, appeals from his conviction for second degree murder. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas 
The state charged Wright with murder for killing Preston James Gilmer 
with a handgun. (R., vol. I, pp. 51-52.) Before trial the district court ruled, in 
limine, that the proffered testimony regarding eyewitness identification of defense 
expert Roy Malpass, Ph.D., was inadmissible as it would not assist the jury. (R., 
vol. I, pp. 160-66.) During trial the court rejected a defense request for 
instructions on weighing eyewitness evidence, concluding that the approved lCJl 
instructions on weighing evidence adequately instructed the jury on that subject. 
(Tr., p. 759, L. 24 - p. 760, L. 11 .) 
At the conclusion of the trial the jury found Wright guilty of second-degree 
murder. (R., vol. 11, p. 235.) The district court sentenced Wright to life with 60 
years fixed. (R., vol. 11, pp. 240-43.) Wright timely appealed from entry of the 
judgment of conviction. (R., vol. 11, pp. 244-48.) 
ISSUES 
Wright states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by excluding the 
testimony of Dr. Malpass regarding eyewitness reliability? 
2. Did the district court err by failing to instruct the jury on the 
factors it could consider in evaluating eyewitness testimony? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
unified sentence of life, with sixty years fixed, upon Mr. Wright 
following his conviction for second degree murder? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
i 
1. Dr. Malpass offered to testify that certain factors had been shown in 
controlled social science experiments to statistically affect the accuracy of 
eyewitness recollection of events. He testified that he could not determine 
if such factors actually affected the accuracy of eyewitness testimony in 
this case. Has Wright failed to show that the district court abused its 
discretion in excluding this testimony because it is speculative and 
unsubstantiated by the facts of the case? 
2. Wright offered a proposed jury instruction on certain factors the jury 
should consider in evaluating the credibility of eyewitness testimony. The 
I 
court rejected this instruction by concluding that the jury was adequately 
instructed. Has Wright failed to show that the jury instructions were 
misleading? 
3. The district court sentenced Wright to life with 60 years fixed for the 
murder of P.J. Gilmer. Has Wright failed to show that the district court 
abused its sentencing discretion? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Wriqht Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court's Order Holding 
Inadmissible The Proffered Testimonv Of Dr. Maloass 
A. Introduction 
The district court excluded the proffered testimony of Dr. Malpass, which it 
characterized as follows: 
Dr. Malpass does not plan to testify about any particular 
witness but rather intends to testify to the effect generally on 
perception in incidents dealing with weapons, cross-racial 
identification, the effect of post-incident information, the absence of 
a correlation between an eyewitness's confidence and reliability, 
time perception distortions, composition of line-up, and event- 
specific factors such as lighting or clothing. 
(R., vol. I, p. 165 (emphasis original).) The court noted that three witnesses had 
identified Wright, two of whom actually knew him.' (R., voi. I, p. 160.) The one 
witness who did not know Wright failed to identify Wright from the first lineup he 
was shown, but did identify him from a profile lineup. (R., vol. I, pp. 160-61.) The 
court noted: "This is not a case based exclusively on eye witness evidence and is 
not a case of identification exclusively by strangers." (R., vol. I, p. 161.) 
The court also observed that "Dr. Malpass clearly testified that he could 
not give an opinion as to the specific witness's reliability and limited his testimony 
in terms 'might indicate,' 'possibly' and 'could be.' He also admitted that there 
are few real studies of actual eye witness identifications, comparing various eye 
' As will be discussed at pages 5-6, infra, at trial one witness who did not know 
Wright identified him as the shooter and three other witnesses who did know 
Wright put him at the scene of the murder in the company of the victim at or near 
the time of the shooting. Thus, the corroborating evidence at trial was even 
greater than known to the trial judge when she ruled on the motion in limine. 
witness accounts." (R., vol. I, pp. 162-63 (emphasis original).) The court 
ultimately decided the proffered testimony did not establish that the scientific 
principles discussed by Dr. Malpass would be "reliable indicators of eye witness 
behavior under the circumstances presented here." (R., vol. I, p. 163.) The court 
further concluded that the testimony would not be helpful to the jurors. (R., vol. I ,  
pp. 165-66.) 
On appeal Wright argues that the very generality of the proffered 
testimony is what makes it admissible. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-1 1.) The state 
submits that testimony of concepts so abstract that even the propounding expert 
cannot apply them to the facts of the case was properly excluded as not helpful 
to a jury of twelve lay persons. 
B. Standard of Review 
The admissibility of expert testimony is discretionary and will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Crea, 
119 ldaho 352, 806 P.2d 445 (1991); State v. Parkinson, 128 ldaho 29, 909 P.2d 
647 (Ct. App. 1996). 
C.  Wr i~h t  Has Failed To Show Any Abuse Of Discretion In The District 
Court's Determination That The Testimony Of Dr. Malpass Was 
Inadmissible 
"To be admissible, the expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." State v. Joslin, 145 
ldaho 75, 81, 175 P.3d 764, 770 (2007) (quotations omitted); see also I.R.E. 702. 
"Expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in 
the record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict and, therefore, is 
inadmissible as evidence," Weeks v. Eastern ldaho Health Services, 143 ldaho 
834, 838, 153 P.3d 11 80, 1184 (2007); see also State v. Schneider, 129 ldaho 
59, 921 P.2d 759 (Ct. App. 1996). A decision excluding expert testimony on 
eyewitness identification is generally not an abuse of discretion "unless the 
government's case against the defendant rested exclusively on uncorroborated 
eyewitness testimony." United States v. Villiard, 186 F.3d 893, 895 (8'h Cir. 
1999) (internal quotes and citation omitted). Wright has failed to show an abuse 
of discretion in the district court's conclusions that Dr. Malpass's testimony was 
speculative and unsubstantiated by facts in the record. 
Witness Kyle Russell saw three men -- the victim, Ernest James, and 
Wright -- together; saw Wright shoot the victim; shortly after the shooting 
identified Ernest James as the other man present but excluded him as the 
shooter; and later identified Wright as the shooter. (Tr., p. 594, L. 17 - p. 622, L. 
19.) At trial James and James's girlfriend, Georgette Wadholm, who both knew 
Wright, also placed Wright at the scene of the murder at the time the fatal shots 
were fired, and James's testimony, even though he denied seeing the shots 
actually fired, strongly implicated Wright as the shooter. (Tr., p. 291, L. 8 - p. 
305, L. 5; p. 317, L. 19 - p. 326, L. 13.) Another witness who knew all three 
men, Annie Prescott, saw Wright, James and the victim leave together just 
before the shooting.' (Tr., p. 513, L. 8 - p. 528, L. 8.) Other citizen witnesses 
saw two African-American men matching the description of Wright and James 
fleeing from the shooting. (Tr., p. 162, L. 13 - p. 174, L. 17; p. 303, L. 25 - p. 
306, L. 17; p. 327, L. 5 - p. 337, L. 4; p. 350, L. 2 - p. 357, L. 15.) In addition, 
the jury had the benefit of hearing Russell's description of events and the 
persons involved as he gave it to police on a 911 call made moments after he 
saw the shooting. (Tr., p. 604, Ls. 17-21; p. 606, Ls. 20-23; p. 622, L. 20 - p. 
623, L. 9; State's Exhibit 47.) 
Three witnesses that knew all three men testified that Wright, James, and 
the victim were together just before the shooting. The primary impact of 
Russell's testimony was to identify which of the two men with the victim shot him. 
His identification of Wright as the shooter, and exclusion of James as the 
shooter, was corroborated by James's testimony, the fact Russell was able to 
exclude James as the shooter almost immediately after the shooting, Russell's 
contemporaneous statements in his 91 1 call, and other evidence adduced at trial. 
Russell's identification of Wright is thus strongly corroborated. 
Dr. Malpass would have testified that scientific studies show that such 
factors as cross-racial identification, presence of a weapon, and pre- and post- 
event information may affect the reliability of an eyewitness's account and that 
the relationship between confidence and accuracy is small. (Tr., p. 30, L. 25 - p. 
Prescott's testimony was that the victim left with James and Wright for the 
express purposes of buying a "blunt," a cigar. (Tr., p. 519, Ls. 9-19.) This 
corroborated Russell's testimony that what initially drew his attention to the three 
men was the victim asking Wright if he had "buds [marijuana] for my blunt." (Tr., 
p. 600, L. 2-20.) 
36, L. 21.) He acknowledged, however, that his expertise would not let him 
evaluate if any of these factors that can be measured generally actually affected 
the accuracy of any particular eyewitness identification. (Tr., p. 27, L. 14 - p. 28, 
L. 15; see also Tr., p. 30, Ls. 4-15 (witness could talk generally about the lesser 
reliability of cross-racial identification, but could not testify if that factor actually 
played a role in any given identification).) This is because the factors affecting 
memory and accuracy of eye witness identification are measured statistically and 
are therefore of unknown application to any given instance. (Tr., p. 36, L. 22 - p. 
38, L. 22; p. 41, L. 3 - p. 42, L. 1.) He could therefore only help the jurors make 
a more informed "guess" about what the witness actually saw. (Tr., p. 28, L. 16 - 
Dr. Malpass's testimony was utterly speculative as applied to this case. 
I 
For example, he could offer no testimony or expertise as to whether knowing the 
suspect before the crime would affect identification. (Tr., p. 54, Ls. 14-20.) Here 
three of the witnesses that placed Wright at the scene of the murder, James, 
Wadhoim, and Prescott, knew Wright. (Tr., p. 291, L. 8 - p. 305, L. 5; p. 317, L. 
19 - p. 326, L. 13.) One of those witnesses, James, was also African-American. 
Nothing in Dr. Malpass's proposed testimony would suggest that Ernest James 
or Georgette Wadholm misidentified the friend they had spent the evening with or 
that Annie Prescott might misidentify a person she already knew. Likewise, 
nothing Dr. Malpass testified to is apparently relevant to the testimony of Miguel 
Hurtado or Alex Fung, both of whom gave general descriptions, but not 
identifications, of the two men fleeing the scene of the murder. (Tr., p. 327, L. 5 
-p.337, L.4;p.350,L.2-p.357, L. 15;p.303, L.25-p.306, L. 17; p. 162, L. 
13-p. 174, L. 17.) 
The only witness that Dr. Malpass's testimony even arguably related to 
was Kyle Russell. However, nothing in the offered testimony hinted how 
educating the jury as to what events statistically might affect the accuracy of 
eyewitness recollection in general could assist it in specifically evaluating the 
accuracy of Russell's testimony. In fact, Dr. Malpass testified that the only way 
to actually judge whether an eyewitness was mistaken was to compare the 
eyewitness's account with the other evidence in the case. (Tr., p. 60, Ls. 6-22.) 
Wright never showed that Dr. Malpass's testimony would have assisted the jury 
with this task under the facts of this case. 
Dr. Malpass's testimony offered only generalities based upon what types 
of situations statistically affected accuracy of eyewitness recall in controlled 
experiments. He could not give any guidance to the jury about how social 
science statistical analysis would help the jury in this specific case evaluate 
whether Russell's identification was consistent with the other evidence other than 
better educating their "guess." Wright was no more entitled to use D. Malpass's 
proposed testimony to rebut Russell's identification testimony than he would 
have been entitled to use testimony of an actuary on the statistical likelihood the 
victim was not shot to death to rebut the medical examiner's testimony that the 
victim died from gunshot wounds. The court properly rejected this evidence as 
speculative and uncorroborated by the facts, and therefore unhelpful to the jury. 
II. 
Wriqht Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Reiection Of A Jury 
Instruction Tellinq The Jury To Consider Certain Factors In Evaluatinq 
Eyewitness ldentification Testimonv 
A. Introduction 
Wright requested that the trial court instruct the jury with a California 
instruction that the jury should consider a list of factors in evaluating the reliability 
of eyewitness identification. (Defendant's Request for Additional Jury 
lnstructions Regarding Eyewitness ldentification (appellate exhibit); Tr., p. 744, 
Ls. 4-13.) After hearing argument the court concluded, based upon the state of 
the evidence, that the instructions were adequate without the requested 
instruction. (Tr., p. 744, L. 15 - p. 760, L. 11.) Wright argues that he was 
entitled to the instruction3 because there was no substantial evidence to 
corroborate Russell's testimony identifying Wright as the shooter. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 11-14.) This argument fails on both the law and the facts. 
B. Standard of Review 
Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury is a question of law, 
over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Keaveny, 136 Idaho 31, 33, 
28 P.3d 372, 374 (2001). This Court reviews the instructions to determine 
Wright asked for two instructions, one an instruction that the jury must acquit if it 
has a reasonable doubt on the element of identity and the second listing "factors 
which bear upon the accuracy of the witness' identification of the defendant." 
(Defendant's Request for Additional Jury Instructions Regarding Eyewitness 
ldentification (appellate exhibit).) On appeal Wright abandons any request for 
the first of these instructions and argues only that the second, listing the factors, 
should have been given. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-14.) 
whether, taken as a whole, they fairly and accurately present the issues and 
state the applicable law. Id. 
C. Wriqht Has Failed To Show That The Instructions Given Bv The Court 
I Misled The Jurv Or Preiudiced Him 
I If the instructions given, taken as a whole, fairly and accurately reflect the 
law, there is no error. State v. Stricklin, 136 ldaho 264, 267, 32 P.3d 158, 161 
i 
I (Ct. App. 2001). Reversible error in jury instructions occurs only if the 
I 
I instructions misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. State v. Row, 
I 
131 ldaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998); State v. Colwell, 124 ldaho 
560, 564, 861 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ct. App. 1993). A defendant is not entitled to a 
1 
I jury instruction that is an erroneous statement of the law, is not supported by the 
evidence, is an impermissible comment on the evidence, or is adequately 
I 
covered by other instructions. State v. Johns, 112 ldaho 873, 881, 736 P.2d 
1327, 1335 (1987). "In order to determine whether the defendant's proposed 
I instruction should have been given, this Court must examine the instructions that 
were given and the evidence that was adduced at trial." Id. 
I 
Courts that have analyzed whether juries should be instructed on factors 
to consider in evaluating eyewitness testimony have generally divided into three 
camps: some consider such instructions mandatory whenever eyewitness 
I testimony is the only evidence of identity; others reject the instructions generally 
as either unnecessary or as infringing upon the jury's province; and some allow 
the instructions, but only if there are serious questions about the reliability of the 
eyewitness identification evidence. Gunnina v. State, 701 A.2d 374, 378-81 (Md. 
1997) (and cases cited). No ldaho appellate case has directly addressed this 
issue, but two ldaho cases have mentioned it in dicta, citing to California 
authority adopting the last of these approaches. State v. Sanchez, 142 ldaho 
309, 322, 127 P.3d 212, 225 (Ct. App. 2005) (court "would not have erred" by 
giving eyewitness identification instruction based on California's, but lack of such 
an instruction did not deprive defendant of fair trial); State v. Pacheco, 134 ldaho 
367 n.2, 371, 2 P.3d 752, 756 n.2 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing to California jury 
instruction on eyewitness testimony while holding trial court did not err in 
excluding expert testimony). The district court, relying on the two ldaho cases 
and California authority cited therein, also adopted the view that the issue was 
discretionary and based upon whether it believed the jury would benefit from the 
instruction given the state of the evidence. (Tr., p. 744, L. 15 - p. 760, L. I I .) 
It does not appear from Wright's brief that he disputes the applicable legal 
standard adopted by the district court. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-14.) For sake of 
argument on appeal, and without conceding that such an instruction is not an 
improper usurpation of the jury's function or otherwise generally unhelpful to the 
the state will also assume that the legal standard advocated by Wright both 
below and on appeal, and adopted by the district court, is applicable in this case. 
California courts have held that an instruction on factors affecting the 
reliability of eyewitness identification should be given when "identification is a 
Ironically, Dr. Malpass testified that such instructions are generally unhelpful to 
jurors in the absence of expert testimony explaining them. (Tr., p. 43, L. 10 - p. 
44, L. 4.) 
crucial issue and there is no substantial corroborative e~idence."~ People v. 
m, 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1144, 755 P.2d 1049, 1059 (Cal. 1988). Applying this 
standard, California appellate courts have deemed the instruction unnecessary 
when the identification testimony of an eyewitness was corroborated by an 
accomplice. People v. Ochoa, 19 Ca1.4'~ 353, 966 P.2d 442, 426 (Cal. 1998). 
Likewise, the instruction is unnecessary when the eyewitness in question was the 
defendant's nurse and therefore familiar with him. People v. Chambers, 52 
Cal.3d 81 5, 871,802 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1991). 
In this case the district court concluded that there was sufficient 
corroboration. This conclusion is supported by the record. As set forth in more 
detail above, three witnesses who knew him placed Wright at or near the scene 
of the crime and in the victim's company shortly before (and even during) the 
murder. Other reliable evidence excluded James, the only other person with the 
victim at the time of the murder, as the shooter. Russell's testimony was amply 
corroborated, such that the requested instruction was not required. 
Wright argues that Russell's testimony was not corroborated because only 
Russell specifically testified to seeing Wright shoot the victim. He has failed to 
cite any authority, however, that even suggests that an eyewitness's testimony 
must be corroborated by another witness who actually saw the crime. Wright's 
California also requires "substantial corroborative evidence" before a conviction 
may be had on the testimony of an accomplice. People v. Rodriaues, 8 Cal. 41h 
1060, 1128, 885 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1994). Thus, in California, a defendant who 
establishes there is no substantial corroborative evidence of an accomplice's 
testimony is entitled to an acquittal, while a defendant who establishes the same 
in relation to an eyewitness's testimony is entitled to a special evidence 
instruction listing potential factors in weighing such evidence. 
argument that the only thing that could have corroborated the eyewitness is the 
testimony of another eyewitness is inconsistent with the very authority on which 
he relies. See Wriaht, 45 Cal.3d at 1132-34, 755 P.2d at 1051-51 (special 
evidence instruction required where identity testimony of three eyewitnesses who 
were able to identify' the defendant, out of eleven victims of an armed robbery in 
which the robbers wore nylon stockings over their faces, was deemed 
uncorroborated). 
In addition, the corroborative evidence in this case excluded all other 
persons as the shooter. Thus, the instruction was within the court's discretion to 
exclude. United States v. Brooks, 928 F.2d 1403, 1407-08 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(instruction required "only where the evidence in the case strongly suggest the 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification" (emphasis original, internal quotations 
omitted)); United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (instruction 
required only where identification is beset by "special difficulties"); Gunninq, 701 
A.2d at 385 ("a request. for an eyewitness identification instruction may be 
rejected when there is corroboration of the defendant's participation in the 
crime"); State v. Rovles, 598 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Or. App. 1979) (instruction should 
not be given "except in unusual circumstances"). Wright has failed to show error. 
111. 
Wriaht Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion in Sentencinq 
A. Introduction 
The district court imposed a sentence of life with 60 years determinate. 
(R., vol. 11, pp. 240-42.) Wright argues that the court erred by characterizing the 
murder he committed as "cold blooded," which he claims is equivalent of the 
"premeditated element of first degree murder the jury rejected, and that in some 
unspecified way this violated his right against cruel and unusual punishment. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 15-18.) He also argues that the sentence is excessive in 
light of his mother's characterizations of his record, his family support, and his 
difficult childhood. (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-19.) Review of the record and 
applicable law shows these arguments to be without merit. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where a sentence is not illegal, the defendant has the burden to show that 
it is unreasonable, and thus, a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 121 
ldaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992); State v. Hedaer, 115 ldaho 598, 604, 
768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989). To carry this burden the defendant must 
demonstrate that, under any reasonable view of the facts, his or her sentence is 
unreasonable in light of the four goals of sentencing: protection of society, 
deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. State v. Broadhead, 120 ldaho 141, 
145, 814 P.2d 401, 405 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 
121 ldaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992). A sentence need not, however, achieve all 
of these goals. Rather, a district court does not abuse its discretion by 
disregarding other goals in sentencing in order to protect society. State v. 
Jenkins, 133 ldaho 747, 752, 992 P.2d 196, 201 (1999); State v. Thomas, 133 
ldaho 682,688,991 P.2d 870,876 (Ct. App. 1999). 
C. Wright's Claim On Atmeal That The Court Found Premeditation Is Directly 
Contrarv To The Record 
Wright argues that the district court, despite his acquittal on first degree 
i murder, found that the killing was premeditated and sentenced him for first 
degree murder. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-18.) He bases this argument on the 
I 
fact that the court characterized the murder Wright committed as "cold-blooded" 
i which, he argues, is the legal equivalent of "premeditated." (Appellant's brief, pp. 
16-17.) This argument fails on the law, which allows a sentencing court to 
I consider facts in sentencing even after an acquittal. This argument also fails on 
! the facts because Wright ignores the context of the district court's comments. 
When put in context it is clear that the district court did not find premeditation or 
j 
i sentence Wright for first degree murder. 
It is well-settled law that a district court may consider a broad range of 
evidence in sentencing. State v. Pierce, 100 ldaho 57, 58, 593 P.2d 392, 393 
i 
(1979); State v. Bundy, 122 ldaho 111, 831 P.2d 953 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Holmes, 104 ldaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (Ct. App. 1983). The trial court may even 
consider evidence of bad acts for which the defendant has been acquitted. State 
! 
v. Martin, 142 ldaho 58, 60-61, 122 P.3d 317, 319-20 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing 
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997), and McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 
477 U.S. 79 (1986)). Thus, even if the sentencing court had concluded the 
murder was premeditated, there is no error because this would have been 
perfectly proper. 
I Wright cites no authority that a sentencing court may not consider bad 
! 
acts for which the defendant has been acquitted. Rather, as authority he relies 
on State v. Johnson, 136 Idaho 701, 704, 39 P.3d 641, 644 (Ct. App. 2001). 
(Appellant's brief, p. 17.) Johnson, however, merely stated the standard of 
appellate review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a 
jury verdict. That standard of review has no application here. Wright's claim that 
I the sentencing judge could not consider behavior for which he had been 
I 
acquitted is without legal merit. 
Even if it had legal merit, Wright's argument lacks factual merit. The 
I 
I district court started its com~nents in imposing sentence by specifically stating 
that the crime Wright was convicted of was second degree murder. (Tr., p. 833, 
I 
Ls. 17-19.) The district court did characterize the "nature of the offense" as "cold- 
blooded murder." (Tr., p. 833, L. 20 - p. 834, L. 6.) The court specifically stated, 
however, that it considered the murder to be "cold-blooded" because it wasn't 
committed "in a fit of rage. This,wasnlt because you were angry." (Tr., p. 835, 
Ls. 8-10.) Thus, the term "cold-blooded" as used by the district court was entirely 
consistent with the elements of second degree murder. Wright has taken the 
district court's comments out of context. Placed in context it is clear that the 
court did not find premeditation or believe that Wright's crime was first degree 
murder 
D. Wriqht Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Sentencinq Discretion BV The 
District Court 
I The court exercised its sentencing discretion based on the nature of the 
offense and the character of the defendant. In reviewing the character of the 
I 
offense the court found that Wright killed the victim, P.J. Gilmer, "in an effort to 
strike back at a friend of the victim, Mr. Weed, who had killed a friend of 
Wright's. (Tr., p. 833, L. 20 - p. 835, L. 14.) "There's no evidence that Mr. 
Gilmer ever did anything to you other than be friends with Mr. Weed and for that 
i you took his life." (Tr., p. 835, LS. 10-12.) 
I The court also compared Wright's character to Mr. Weed, the man Wright 
was trying to hurt by killing the victim. (Tr., p. 835, Ls. 15-23.) Although Weed 
I 
I 
did not have a history of violence, Wright had a long history of violence, anti- 
I social behavior, and gang-related activity. (Tr., p. 835, L. 15 - p. 838, L. 25; p. 
839, Ls. 14-19; PSI, pp. 11-16.) Wright had also been granted multiple 
1 
opportunities at rehabilitation, but "[nlothing has worked." (Tr., p. 838, Ls. 9-13; 
I 
I 
see PSI, pp. 15-16.) Evaluations of Wright showed no neuropsychological -
problems, but instead that he had an anti-social personality disorder with 
sociopathic development that made him a risk to the community. (Tr., p. 836, Ls. 
I 
3-9; p. 839, Ls. 1-13; see PSI, pp. 21-22.) Wright also had a long juvenile and 
adult criminal history and was on parole when he committed this crime. (Tr., p. 
839, L. 20-p. 841, L. 2 0 ; a P S I ,  pp. 11-16.) 
The court also specifically considered the statements of Wright's mother, 
the very thing Wright argues on appeal shows an abuse of discretion. (Tr., p. 
842, Ls. 1-22.) The court then applied the considerations of sentencing and 
found that protection of society required a lengthy sentence (Tr., p. 842, L. 23 - 
I p. 843, L. 24); found that there was nothing indicating that Wright could be 
rehabilitated (Tr., p. 843, L. 25 - p. 844, L. 7); and found that deterrence favored 
a lengthy sentence to prevent revenge killings (Tr., p. 844, L. 8 - p. 845, L. 10). 
The court then declined to give the fixed life sentence recommended by the 
prosecutor, declined to give the sentence of life with 20 years fixed 
recommended by the defense, and imposed a sentence of life with 60 years 
fixed. (Tr., p. 845, L. 11 - p. 846, L. 3.) 
Wright contests none of the district court findings or analysis. He instead 
only argues that the court should have given greater weight to the input of his 
mother and the arguments of his counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-19,) This 
shows no abuse of discretion. Given the facts of this case, a fixed life sentence 
would have been within the bounds of discretion. Therefore a sentence very 
nearly as great as a fixed life sentence is also within the court's discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Wright's conviction and 
sentence. 
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